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Abstract
Imperfect information and inattention can lead consumers to undervalue the energy efﬁciency of
products, contributing to growing environmental problems and climate change. To nudge individuals
towards energy efﬁciency, environmental certiﬁcation schemes, such as the EuropeanUnion (EU)
energy label, present grade-like efﬁciency classes. In a real-stakes randomized controlled trial, we
contrast this approachwith a control condition that gives no energy-related information and an
alternative treatment condition that provides detailed information on the lifetime cost of energy-using
durables. Our results show that the EU energy label does not increase demand for energy-efﬁcient
products over a control condition. By contrast, lifetime-cost information increases thewillingness-to-
pay for energy efﬁciency considerably.
1. Introduction
Many appliances we use in daily life have two cost
components: an upfront purchase cost that is very
salient, but also a usage cost that accumulates over
time and depends on the product’s energy efﬁciency.
Prominent examples are different types of light bulbs
(e.g. compact ﬂuorescent light (CFL) bulbs versus LED
lights), refrigerators of different energy efﬁciency, or
cars with different fuel efﬁciency. Imperfect informa-
tion and limited attention can bias choices in favor of
the immediately visible (e.g. Chetty et al 2009,
Tiefenbeck et al 2018). This can cause individuals to
overlook differences in usage cost (Allcott and
Taubinsky 2015) and excessively focus on the upfront
price. It can thus lead individuals to favor energy-
inefﬁcient products, even though it is not even in their
own self interest, and compound problems of environ-
mental pollution and climate change.
A popular policy response is to try to ‘nudge’ indi-
viduals to correct for this bias (Thaler and Sunstein
2008, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, Benartzi et al
2017). For example, the European Union (EU) has
introduced an energy label, which aims to foster pur-
chase decisions of energy-efﬁcient products. The EU
label presents energy efﬁciency classes, a suggestive
grade-like quality assessment that ranges from A++
to E and displays colors that change from green to red
as efﬁciency classes get worse. Such energy labels based
on efﬁciency classes are employed in many countries
beyond the EU, including Brazil andChina.
In this paper, we compare the effectiveness of the EU
energy label to a control condition where individuals
receive no information about a product’s energy efﬁ-
ciency. In a second treatment condition, we inform indi-
viduals of the total lifetime cost from using the energy-
consuming durables, i.e. the sum of purchase and oper-
ating cost. In our experiment, participants make actual
purchase decisions and choose between anLEDbulb or a
less energy-efﬁcient CFL bulb, the two main lighting
technologies currently used in Germany. We vary the
prices of both bulbs and infer participants’ revealed will-
ingness-to-pay (WTP) for themore energy-efﬁcient LED
bulb, relative to theCFLbulb.
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Our study focuses on the light bulb market for
two main reasons. First, improving the efﬁciency of
lighting is considered one of the most cost-effective
ways to reduce residential greenhouse gas emissions
(e.g. McKinsey and Company 2009, Davis 2017).
Recent technological breakthroughs have lead to the
development of very efﬁcient LED bulbs that need
about 80%–90% less energy than comparable
incandescent bulbs. Second, light bulbs are an elec-
tricity-using durable that most consumers buy reg-
ularly. Our study participants are thus familiar with
the purchase decisions that we analyze in our
experiment.
Despite the wide application of the EU energy
label, causal evidence on how it inﬂuences real-stakes
purchase decisions is missing. Previous studies have
demonstrated the potential of information to over-
come salience bias, without focusing on energy
labels. For instance, Allcott and Taubinsky (2015)
conduct an incentive-compatible ﬁeld experiment
and ﬁnd that information on lifetime cost increases
the WTP for CFL over incandescent light bulbs. In
addition, Camilleri and Larrick (2014) ﬁnd that con-
sumers purchase energy-efﬁcient cars more often
when lifetime operating cost are displayed. Yet, whe-
ther the current EU energy label taps into this poten-
tial has remained unexplored. Further literature on
energy efﬁciency has extensively investigated the role
of determinants for energy-efﬁcient investments and
behaviors (e.g. Poortinga et al 2003 and Gillingham
et al 2009 for an overview) and to what extend
greater consumption offsets the energy saved by efﬁ-
ciency improvements, the so-called rebound effect
(e.g. Greening et al 2000, Frondel and Vance 2013,
Gillingham et al 2013).
With respect to energy labels, some studies have
used hypothetical choice experiments to compare how
different EU label elements affect consumer choices.
Newell and Siikamäki (2014), for example, conclude
that participants value energy efﬁciency by even more
than its true discounted value when confronted with a
modiﬁed EU label that additionally displays operating
cost. Furthermore, Andor et al (2017) exploit dis-
continuities in the assignment of efﬁciency classes and
ﬁnd that more than two thirds of participants state a
positive WTP for an appliance with a better efﬁciency
class, even when energy uses are virtually the same.
Other studies have analyzed real-stake decisions, but
without employing an experimental research design
that ensures a reliable identiﬁcation of causal effects.
For example, Kallbekken et al (2013) conduct an
experiment with non-random treatment assignment
in six stores in Norway and cannot detect a statistically
signiﬁcant effect of presenting operating cost informa-
tion to consumers as long as the sales staff receives no
supplementary training. Stadelmann and Schubert
(2018) investigate purchase decisions of several appli-
ances in an online store and present the EU label, a
newly designed lifetime-cost label or none of them.
Based on pre-post comparisons, they do not detect dif-
ferences in the effectiveness of both labels, except for
one appliance, where operating cost information is
less effective than the current EU label to increase the
uptake of energy-efﬁcient appliances.6
We contribute to the literature by, ﬁrst, directly
testing the effectiveness of the current EU energy label
against a control condition that does not provide any
information about energy efﬁciency. Most of the stu-
dies so far have investigated how the energy label
should be amended to become more effective, yet the
effectiveness of the current EU label against a control
conditionwithout energy information has received lit-
tle attention, despite its relevance for judging the suit-
ability of that policy. Second, we conduct a
randomized controlled trial with a clean empirical
strategy to identify the causal effects of the EU energy
label and, in addition, a second treatment condition
that informs participants about the total lifetime cost
of the product. Third, we analyze real-stakes purchase
decisions and thus avoid possible biases from stated
preference elicitation approaches (List and Gallet
2001,Harrison andRutström 2008).
Our evidence shows that the current EU energy
label fails to realize its potential. When we present the
EU label, theWTP for the more energy-efﬁcient LEDs
remains the same as in the control condition, where no
information was provided. By contrast, communicat-
ing the lifetime-cost information has a substantial
positive effect on the WTP. These results suggest a
revision of the current EU energy label by making life-
time energy costmore salient. On amore general note,
they illustrate that information about lifetime cost is a
core determinant of purchase decisions, in contrast to
suggestive grade-like information, as shown on the EU
energy label.
2. Experimental design anddata
Our study population consists of 719 household
heads that take part in a smart-meter study of a large
German utility. As we show in appendix A, available
online atstacks.iop.org/ERL/14/044001/mmedia,
the socioeconomic characteristics of study partici-
pants closely match German averages in terms of age,
gender, net income, employment status, and appliance
possessions. In our study population, the percentage
of home owners exceeds the German average (76%,
compared to 44%), which is also reﬂected in slightly
higher daily electricity consumptions (10.3 kWh,
compared to 8.9 kWh) and household sizes (2.4,
compared to 2.0).
We determine participants’ relative WTP for a
more energy-efﬁcient LED light bulb in comparison to
a CFL bulb by using the elicitation format fromAllcott
6
For a more comprehensive overview of the energy labeling
literature see, for example, Andor and Fels 2018.
2
Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 044001
and Taubinsky (2015). Our experiment is part of a sur-
vey and proceeds in four steps. First, we inform parti-
cipants about the choice tasks and the technical
characteristics of the LED bulb and the CFL bulb.7 To
limit the inﬂuence of confounding attributes other
than energy efﬁciency, we choose bulbs of the same
manufacturer, light intensity, and color.
In a second step, participants ﬁll out a multiple
price list and make 15 baseline choices between both
bulbs at different relative prices. The relative prices, i.e.
the price differences between the LED and the CFL
bulb, range from−7 to 7 EUR. In a third step, we ran-
domly assign participants into one of the three exper-
imental conditions and provide them with different
information on the bulbs. Participants in the cost con-
dition obtain information on the total purchase and
operating cost of consuming 15 000 h of light from
CFL (68 EUR) and LED (39 EUR) bulbs, respectively.
We discuss the role of the different cost components
and summarize total cost as illustrated in Panel (a) of
ﬁgure 1. In the label condition, we explain the mean-
ing of the EU energy label and present the actual label
of the CFL (efﬁciency class A) and the LED bulb (efﬁ-
ciency class A+), as illustrated in Panel (b). Partici-
pants in a control condition obtain information on the
evolution of overall lamp purchases in Germany
between 2008–2012 (Panel c). The information in the
control condition is not intended to inﬂuence the
WTP for either bulb, but allows to account for any fac-
tor other than our treatments that may distinguish
endline from baseline choices, such as choice fatigue
(e.g. Augenblick andNicholson 2016).
In a fourth step, we confront participants with 15
endline choices that are based on the same multiple
price list format from the baseline choices. After the
experiment, one of the 30 baseline and endline choices
is randomly selected. Participants obtain the chosen
bulb and an Amazon voucher on their remaining bud-
get, i.e. the initial budget less the price of the chosen
bulb. The size of the budget was announced at the
beginning of the survey and exceeds the maximum
bulb price by 1, so that participants can afford to buy
each bulb at price of the price list.
As part of our experimental design, we also tested
whether scaling both the budget and prices inﬂuences
participants’ choices. To do so, we implemented all
three experimental conditions with a budget of 12
EUR and prices between 4–11 EUR. In addition, we
implemented two conditions that correspond to the
control and the cost conditions, but use a budget of 8
EUR with prices ranging from 0–7 EUR, thereby pre-
serving economic incentives. As appendix C illus-
trates, changes in WTP remain unaffected when we
scale the price lists. Therefore, we jointly analyze parti-
cipants’ responses for higher and lower price lists,
which results in larger sample sizes for the control and
Figure 1.Visualization of the experimental conditions.
7
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the cost conditions. AppendixD shows that our results
remain unchanged when we exclude the participants
that got the price list with the lower budget and prices.
We use participants’ choices to elicit their relative
WTP for the LED bulb. We determine the two relative
prices at which participants’ choices switch from the
LED to the CFL bulb and set participants’ relative
WTP to the mean of both prices. For example, when a
participant prefers the LED at a relative price of 3 EUR,
and theCFL at a relative price of 4 EUR,we set the rela-
tive WTP to 3.5 EUR. Some participants prefer the
LED or CFL bulb at all relative prices and we set their
relativeWTP to 7 or -7 EUR, respectively. Aswe do not
observe relative WTP higher than 7 EUR, this proce-
dure gives us lower bounds for both the average rela-
tiveWTP and its change in response to the treatments.
We exclude all participants who did not make all 30
choices (141 participants) or switchedmore than once
from prefering one bulb over the other (19 partici-
pants), which leaves uswith a total of 559 participants.
As demonstrated by the descriptive statistics
from table 1, randomization was successful to achieve
balance between the three experimental conditions
with regard to key demographic variables, such as
household size, the average age of household mem-
bers, and net income. In the experiment, more than
50 percent of the participants choose themore energy-
efﬁcient LED bulb even at relative prices of 7 EUR. As
the relative market prices are about 1.5 EUR for the
two bulbs used in our experiment, those participants
certainly choose the LED bulbs and thus they do not
constitute the target population of our treatments.
Accordingly, we disregard those participants in the
remainder of this paper, but show in appendix D that
the treatment effects remain qualitatively the same
when we include them. The remaining participants
largely undervalue energy efﬁciency on average: While
the lifetime cost difference between both bulbs is 29
EUR, the average relative WTP for the LED bulb is
only around 3 EUR.
3. Results
We start by visualizing the effects of the experimental
conditions on endline demand. As ﬁgure 2 shows,
demand for LEDs of participants in the label condition
is virtually indistinguishable from those in the
control condition. In contrast, the demand curve for
Table 1.Descriptive statistics, by experimental condition.
Control Cost Label P-value (F-test
Condition Condition Condition formean equality)
Household size 2.52 2.47 2.38 0.50
Age of householdmembers, in years 48.83 49.77 49.44 0.83
Net household income, in 1000 EUR 5.82 5.87 5.89 0.94
Share of part. with baselineWTP7, in% 0.61 0.63 0.52 0.16
BaselineWTP, in EUR (baselineWTP<7) 2.95 2.97 3.25 0.78
Number of participants 216 224 119 Σ=559
Number of participants (baselineWTP<7) 85 84 57 Σ=226
Notes: P-values are from an F-Test for mean equality of the respective variables for all three experimental conditions.
BaselineWTP excludes all WTP from the analysis that exceed 7 EUR. Observations in the label condition are only about
half the number in the other conditions as we have duplicated the control and cost conditions to test for framing effects,
as explained in appendix C.
Figure 2.Endline demand for LEDbulbs, by experimental condition.
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participants in the cost condition shifts to the right,
which provides ﬁrst graphical evidence that cost
information inﬂuences choices more strongly than the
grade-like summary information from the EU label.
Next, we quantify the effect of the treatments on
WTP. As the columns (1)–(3) in table 2 illustrate, par-
ticipants in the control condition on average increased
their relative WTP from 3.0 EUR in the baseline to 3.3
EUR in the endline elicitation, a difference of 0.3 EUR
that is not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional
level, though. Participants in the label condition raised
their relative WTP only slightly more, by a statistically
insigniﬁcant 0.4 EUR. In contrast, this difference is far
more pronounced for participants in the cost condi-
tion, reaching an average of 1.6 EUR, which is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at all conventional levels.
We now turn to the estimation of the average
treatment effects (ATE) of the label and cost condition
by estimating the followingmodel:
a b gD = + + +LC CCWTP ,i i i i
where DWTPi is the difference in the relative WTP of
participant i between the endline and baseline
elicitation, LCi and CCi are dummy variables that
equal 1 if participant i is in the label and cost
conditions, respectively, and òi is the error term. In this
model, participants in the control condition constitute
the omitted base group andβ and γ identify the ATE of
the label and cost conditions, respectively.We estimate
the equation by OLS and report heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors.
The fourth column of table 2 illustrates that the
ATE of the label condition amounts only to 0.1 EUR,
or 4% of baseline relative WTP (0.141/3.246), and is
not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level. In
contrast, the ATE of the cost condition reaches 45% of
baseline relativeWTP (1.331/2.970) and is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. When we test for differ-
ences between both ATE, we can clearly reject the null
hypothesis that they are the same at all conventional
levels (F-Statistic=9.03, P-Value: 0.003).
Next, we explore the differential impact of the label
and cost conditions on the distribution of WTP differ-
ences between the baseline and the endline elicitation. As
ﬁgure 3 illustrates, around 60% of participants in the
label conditiondonot change their relativeWTPat all. In
Table 2.AverageWTP for baseline and endline choices and average treatment effects (ATE).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline (B) Endline (E) Difference (E–B), ATE,
AverageWTP, in EUR AverageWTP, in EUR in EUR in EUR
Control Condition 2.953 3.259 0.306 .
(0.261) (0.243) (0.179) .
Label Condition 3.246 3.693 0.447 0.141
(0.321) (0.305) (0.265) (0.320)
Cost Condition 2.970 4.607 1.637a 1.331a
(0.325) (0.315) (0.294) (0.345)
# of participants 226 226 226 226
Notes:
a Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parantheses and with respect to within
differences (Column 3) and heteroscedasticity robust (Column 4). ATE denotes the average treatment effect.
Participants with baseline relativeWTP 7 EUR are excluded from the analysis.
Figure 3.Change inWTP after treatment in the cost and label conditions. Note:for better readability, we exclude four observations
with relative willingness-to-pay (WTP) differences larger than 7 EUR.
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the cost condition, only around 40 percent of the partici-
pants do not adjust their WTP and many participants
increase theWTPbyaround3–5EUR.
4.Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the effectiveness of
two approaches to increase the WTP for energy
efﬁciency: the current EU label, which presents grade-
like efﬁciency classes, and an intervention that informs
participants about the total lifetime-cost savings that
arise frommore energy-efﬁcient purchases.
Our results from an incentive-compatible rando-
mized controlled trial show that cost information is
substantially more effective in increasing the WTP for
energy efﬁciency than the current EU energy label. In
particular, we ﬁnd that the EU energy label has no sta-
tistically and economically signiﬁcant effect on the
WTP for the energy-efﬁcient technology, while pre-
senting detailed lifetime-cost information increases
relative WTP for the energy-efﬁcient LED bulbs by
about 45%of baselineWTP.
An explanation for the muted response of con-
sumers to the current EU energy label may be that the
range of efﬁciency classes for the products that are
available on the market is narrow, which may suggest
that differences in energy efﬁciency are only minor.
For instance, in our study, participants compare light
bulbs with an efﬁciency class of A+ and A, respec-
tively, while the range displayed on the label ranges
from A++ to E. Importantly, such narrow banding is
not an exceptional feature of our study, but typical for
the EU label. It is a consequence of the so-called EU
Ecodesign Directive, which has imposed minimum
standards for energy efﬁciency. For example, while
the label for fridges, washing machines, and dish
washers displays a range from A+++ to D, efﬁciency
standards ban appliances from the market that have
an efﬁciency class worse thanA+ for fridges andwash-
ing machines, and worse than A++ for dish washers
(EUDirectives 643/2009, 1015/2010, 1016/2010).
Our ﬁndings contrast with EU expectations that its
current energy labels and efﬁciency standards will
annually save 175 million tonnes of oil equivalent by
2020, approximately the annual primary energy con-
sumption of Italy (European Commission 2016).
While we cannot assess the effectiveness of efﬁciency
standards in this paper, our evidence suggests that the
contribution of the current EU energy labels is only
minor. In contrast, information that makes operating
cost more salient is very effective, which offers gui-
dance for the design of effective climate policies. For
example, energy labels could easily be amended to
include operating cost estimates. Furthermore, pro-
duct inserts could present detailed information how
energy efﬁciency translates into operating cost, just as
we did with our study participants. In addition,
digitization of shopping behaviors allows to convey
personalized product information to consumers at the
time of purchase, e.g. in web shops. Alternatively, a
recalibration of energy efﬁciency classes that avoids
the current narrow banding and employs the full range
from A–G to distinguish products on the market, for
example, could increase the effectiveness of the EU
energy label. Yet, whether such rescaling actually fos-
ters more energy-efﬁcient choices is unknown and
thus an interesting question for future research.
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